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In developing countries, consumers can buy many goods from either the formal sector
or the informal sector and choose the sector to patronize based on the product’s price
there and anticipated quality. We assume that ﬁrms can produce in either sector and
can adjust quality at a cost. In the long run, ﬁrms produce in the sector that is
more proﬁtable. As for the consumers, we assume they cannot assess quality prior
to purchase and cannot, at a reasonable cost, identify the producer of what they
are purchasing. Many products (meats, fruits, vegetables, ﬁsh, grains) sold both in
formal groceries and, less formally, on the street ﬁt this description. Using this model,
we investigate how a change in regulations in the formal sector aﬀects quality, price,
aggregate production and the number of ﬁrms in each sector.
Keywords: experience good, formal sector, informal sector, quality
JEL classiﬁcation: 017, D431 Introduction
In his V.V. Giri Memorial Lecture, Ravi Kanbur (2009) discusses the “informality
discourse” in the development literature and makes several constructive suggestions.
Kanbur notes that the literature would beneﬁt from a more precise speciﬁcation of
the regulations imposed in the formal sector as well as from a recognition that such
regulations on ﬁrms in the formal sector may induce them to “adjust activity to move
out of the ambit of the regulation.”
We adopt his suggestions. We consider two regulations. For each policy, we consider
(1) its “short-run” eﬀects before ﬁrms can change sectors and (2) its “long-run” eﬀects
after ﬁrms have had an opportunity to switch sectors. We note that a government
regulation need not induce ﬁrms to ﬂee to the informal sector but instead might attract
them away from that sector.
Regulation of the formal sector aﬀects the informal sector because the two sectors
are not isolated from one another. As Kanbur emphasizes, ﬁrms can choose whether
to locate in one sector or the other. In addition, consumers are free to patronize one
sector or the other. Finally, workers can choose a job in the formal sector or a job
in the informal sector. Indeed, economic agents often participate simultaneously in
both sectors, as Keith Hart, who introduced the term “informality” to the literature,
notes in his pioneering study of Ghana’s economy: “Everyone in Accra, but especially
the inhabitants of the slum where I lived, tried to combine the two sources [from the
formal and informal sectors] of income” (2006).
The economics literature on the formal and informal sectors has long recognized
that regulating the formal sector will have spillover eﬀects. Most recently, Marjit and
Kar (forthcoming) consider a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model with each good
produced in both the formal and informal sectors and show that a decline in tariﬀ rate
1should increase the informal wage in a developing economy.
In the standard HOS model, however, the goods produced and traded are of uniform
quality. Firms may produce guns or butter and, in the extended models, each good
may be produced in both a formal and an informal sector. But all the butter is of
uniform quality. Firms cannot alter this quality, and consumers are certain this quality
will be provided.
We depart from these assumptions. We focus instead on experience goods—goods
the quality of which cannot be determined prior to purchase. However, unlike Ak-
erlof (1970), we assume that ﬁrms choose quality endogenously. Moreover, we focus
on a class of experience goods that, although pervasive, has received relatively little
attention: where the consumer cannot determine at reasonable cost who produced the
good. Of course, consumers in developed countries encounter such goods every day.
When we buy a Washington apple, we do not know how it will taste and we cannot
ascertain what orchard produced it. Moreover, globalization has raised the frequency
with which consumers in developed countries encounter such products, as we discuss
elsewhere (McQuade et al. 2010). But in developing countries, consumers encounter
such goods not only in stores that are subject to government regulation, but also on
the street in the “informal market.”
Consumers in developing countries often have concerns about the goods they pur-
chase. Fruits, vegetables, meats, ﬁsh, grains, coﬀee beans, videos, and other goods are
sold both in stores subject to government regulation and on the street in the infor-
mal market. The quality (both the taste and the health consequences) of consuming
these goods is uncertain prior to purchase; often the purchase must be made without
knowing who grew or manufactured the product. Cooking oil in India is sold both in
groceries and on the street. In either case, a consumer does not know whether it has
been adulterated, nor is the source of the oil easy to determine. The same is true of
2maize in Kenya. A consumer can buy it in a grocery or on the street. But in either
case, there is uncertainty about whether it has been stored improperly and become
contaminated with aﬂatoxin, a fungus that cannot be detected by casual visual inspec-
tion. Panela, a sugar produced in massive quantities in Colombia and elsewhere in
Latin America, is another example of a good sold in both formal and informal markets.
In each case, the quality is impossible to ascertain prior to purchase, and any of a large
set of households or ﬁrms might have produced it.
The problem faced by producers of such experience goods is formidable. They
know the quality of the goods they produce. But they realize that there is no way for
potential buyers to distinguish the quality of their product from the quality of the other
products lumped together in the consumer’s mind. They recognize, therefore, that they
share a “collective reputation.” Not surprisingly, a producer does not have as much
incentive to make a product of high quality as he would if consumers distinguished his
products from those of his competitors.
Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Shapiro (1983) consider markets for experience goods,
but their analyses are conﬁned to packaged or branded experience goods that enable
the consumer to determine the identity of the producer. In the steady state of Shapiro’s
model, some ﬁrms specialize in one quality and receive one price, and other ﬁrms
specialize in a diﬀerent quality and receive diﬀerent prices. In these formulations, one
ﬁrm’s quality choice has no eﬀect on another ﬁrm’s future reputation for quality.
The literature on “collective reputation” investigates the situation where it is costly
for ﬁrms to improve the quality of the experience goods they produce and where con-
sumers cannot distinguish the products of diﬀerent ﬁrms (or farms). As a result, all
ﬁrms sell at a common price and share a common reputation for quality. The ﬁrst
paper in this literature was Winfree and McCluskey (2005).1 In their model, output
1Tirole (1996) coined the term “collective reputation” and was the ﬁrst to analyze the phenomenon.
3is exogenous, entry is prohibited, and ﬁrms are constrained to oﬀer a single quality.
Under these assumptions, Winfree and McCluskey show that when ﬁrms share a col-
lective reputation, they have an incentive in the steady state of their dynamic model
to free ride and to produce low-quality goods. In a recent working paper, Rouvi` ere
and Soubeyran (2008) retain the assumption of a ﬁxed output and the constraint that
ﬁrms choose a single quality but permit entry. They show that free riding causes entry
into the market to be suboptimal.
In this paper, we consider n producers of an experience good, selling to hetero-
geneous consumers. Firms choose whether to sell entirely in the formal market or
entirely in the informal market. The ﬁrms in the formal market are subject to govern-
ment regulation, whereas ﬁrms in the informal market are unregulated. Consumers
may patronize either market (or neither market). Consumers cannot judge the quality
of the goods prior to purchase and cannot, at reasonable expense, determine the iden-
tity of the producer. However, consumers can identify whether the good comes from
the formal or the informal market. In equilibrium, the experience good sells for one
price in the formal market and a possibly diﬀerent price in the informal market. The
reputed quality of the experience good may diﬀer in the two markets. We consider
both the short-run equilibrium and the long-run equilibrium. In the short run, ﬁrms
remain in an exogenously designated market. In the long run, ﬁrms move to the more
proﬁtable market. In the short-run equilibrium, the quantity and quality choices of
each ﬁrm form a Nash equilibrium. In addition, in the long run, ﬁrms migrate until
proﬁts equalize in the two sectors.2
However, his focus was not on the strategic interaction of ﬁrms but on the reputations of workers.
In Tirole’s formulation, an agent’s own past behavior is imperfectly observed, and he is assessed not
only on the basis of his own past actions but also on the collective past actions of others. In contrast,
past behavior of our ﬁrms is not observed and they have no individual reputations, only a collective
one.
2One can interpret the long-run equilibrium as a prior stage in a two-stage game where each of
the n ﬁrms decides whether to locate in the formal or the informal sector.
4In the next section, we introduce our model. In section 3 we discuss the eﬀects of
each regulation on the two sectors in the short and long run. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a country in which there is both a formal (F)a n da ni n f o r m a l( I)m a r k e t
for a good. The formal market is visible to the government and is subject to the
regulations imposed upon it. Conversely, the informal sector consists of ﬁrms that are
invisible to the government and are not subject to any of the regulations constraining
the actions of the formal sector. We suppose that there are n producers of the ﬁnal
good, who allocate themselves between the formal and informal sectors. We take
n to be even and allow for continuous adjustment of the number of ﬁrms.3 Each
ﬁrm, denoted by i,i ns e c t o rj for j ∈{ F,I} sets quality kij ∈ [0,∞)a n dq u a n t i t y
qij ∈ [0,∞)s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .
Consumers form independent views about the quality of the goods emanating from
the formal and informal markets but cannot trace a good to a particular ﬁrm within
as e c t o r .I no t h e rw o r d s ,ﬁ r m si nap a r t i c u l a rs e c t o rs h a r eac o l l e c t i v er e p u t a t i o no n
quality with the other ﬁrms in the sector. To be precise, ﬁrms in sector j develop a







where nj is the number of ﬁrms in sector j and Qj is the total quantity of the good
produced by sector j.B e c a u s e c o n s u m e r s c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h ﬁ r m s w i t h i n s e c t o r j,
3We make this assumption only for tractability. Allowing for an odd number of ﬁrms or considering
measure-theoretic analyses where ﬁrms are inﬁnitesimal in size changes none of the qualitative results
and serves only to add unimportant technical considerations.
5every ﬁrm operating in a given market sells its experience good at the same price
(P j), and the merchandise of every ﬁrm has the same reputed quality (Rj).
We specify consumer utility to generate an inverse demand curve for each sec-
tor that is strictly increasing in that sector’s reputed quality, strictly decreasing and
strictly concave in the total output of the two sectors, and additively separable in the
two variables. In particular, we assume that every consumer gets net utility u from
purchasing one unit of the experience good of reputed quality R at price p: u = θR−p.
Consumers can purchase a substitute that provides a reservation utility, and they buy
the experience good if and only if it provides higher net utility than the outside option.
We assume that consumers have the same θ but diﬀer in their reservation utilities.
Consumers observe the reputations for quality of the formal and informal sector,
respectively. The price they pay depends on the aggregate supply of the experience
good in the two sectors. Suppose that, given the distribution of reservation utilities,
au t i l i t yo fU(Q)m u s tb eo ﬀ e r e dt oa t t r a c tQ customers to the experience good. We
assume that U(Q) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice diﬀerentiable and
that U(0) = 0. U(Q) is not the utility function of a single consumer, but rather reﬂects
the distribution of the reservation utilities of the heterogeneous consumers.4 Price
adjusts in each sector such that consumers are indiﬀerent about whether they purchase
the experience good on either the formal or informal market. Every purchaser receives
the same net utility U(Q). Inframarginal buyers strictly prefer the experience good
to their outside option while the marginal buyer is indiﬀerent between the experience
good and the outside option since both yield net utility U(Q). More formally, let the
4Formally, let µ be a σ-ﬁnite measure on [0,∞). Deﬁne Q(U)=
￿ U
0 dµ. We assume that Q(0) = 0
and that Q(U) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. Let U(Q) ≡ Q−1(U).







θRj − U(Q); if Q<U −1(θRj)
0; if Q ≥ U−1(θRj)
(2)
Hence, we can see that the inverse demand curve is additively separable over the set
{(Q,Rj)|Q<U −1(θRj)}.
Suppose ex-ante there are nF ﬁrms registered in the formal market and nI ﬁrms
participating in the informal market. Also suppose for the moment that no regulations
have been placed on ﬁrms in the formal sector. Consider the game where each ﬁrm i
(i =1 ,...,n j)i ns e c t o rj (j = F,I) simultaneously chooses its output and quality to
maximize the following payoﬀ function:
qij[P(qij + Q−ij,R
j) − c(kij)] (3)
where c(·)i sas t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n g ,c o n v e xc o s tf u n c t i o nf o rkij > 0; in addition, c(0) =
c￿(0) = 0.
When the other ﬁrms in sector j are producing (Q−ij > 0), then the reputed quality
of sector j is well deﬁned whether or not ﬁrm i is producing. Hence, equation (3) is
well deﬁned. When no ﬁrm in sector j is producing, however, the reputed quality of
that sector is ambiguous, and we deﬁne the proﬁt of ﬁrm i,g i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 3 ) ,a s
zero. This assignment never conﬂicts with (3), as that equation, evaluated at qij =0 ,
gives the same result when Q−ij > 0a n di su n d e ﬁ n e dw h e nQ−ij =0 .
Because ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁts, its decisions must satisfy the following pair of
complementary slackness (denoted c.s.) conditions for Q−ij > 0:
qij ≥ 0,θ R




≤ 0, c.s. (4)




￿(kij)] ≤ 0, c.s. (5)
where, from (1), ∂Rj
∂kij = qij/Qj and ∂Rj
∂qij =( kij − Rj)/Qj.W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r o ﬁ t
function of each ﬁrm, given the other ﬁrms’ strategies, is pseudoconcave.5 We can
establish the following result:
Theorem 2.1 There exist nontrivial Nash equilibria.6 Each includes at least one
active sector, and across all equilibria the same sectors are active. Finally, in each
active sector j, every producer of the experience good sells the same unique, strictly
positive amount (qij = qj > 0, for all i) at the same unique, strictly positive quality
(kij = kj > 0, for all i).
Proof See Appendix A.




dqij =0 . We will focus on the case in
which both the formal and informal markets are operating.7
We can rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions (4) and (5) as follows:
θR
j − U(Q) − c(kj) − qjU






￿(kj)=0 ( 7 )
Equation (6) is a familiar Cournot ﬁrst-order condition. It indicates that the ﬁrm
should increase production until its per-unit proﬁt from expanding output by another
unit (θRj−U(Q)−c(kj)) just equals the losses (qjU￿(Q)) this expansion would impose
5Although we have assumed a speciﬁc functional form for the proﬁt function, the set of functions
that are pseudoconcave is nonempty. The condition should be satisﬁed as long as U(Q) and c(k) are
suﬃciently convex.
6Trivial equilibria are those in which ﬁrms receive a price of zero for the product.
7This will be the case as long as the policies we subsequently consider do not drive every ﬁrm to
the same sector.
8because of the induced price reduction on the other units the ﬁrm was selling. Equation
(7) indicates that each ﬁrm in a given sector raises the quality of its product until
the marginal cost of a further expansion (c￿(kj)), equals the marginal beneﬁt of that
expansion ( θ
nj), which reﬂects the fact that the only ﬁrm raising quality produces 1/nj
of sector j’s output. Equation (7) implies that the sector with the larger number of
ﬁrms will oﬀer lower-quality experience goods. Because prices adjust so that consumers
are indiﬀerent about the source of the good, the products of the larger sector must sell
for lower prices. This in turn ensures that every ﬁrm operating in the larger sector has
lower proﬁt and output, as the following argument shows. In the equilibrium, any ﬁrm
oﬀering quality k earns proﬁt per unit of θk−U(Q)−c(k). As this function is strictly
concave in quality and peaks at k∗,t h ei m p l i c i ts o l u t i o nt oθ = c￿(k∗), equation (7)
implies that in equilibrium, every ﬁrm will choose a quality kj <k ∗. Therefore, the
proﬁt per unit at each ﬁrm in a group rises if the common quality of every ﬁrm in
that group increases. It follows that ﬁrms in the larger sector will have lower proﬁt
per unit than ﬁrms in the smaller sector. But equation (6) implies that any ﬁrm with
a lower proﬁt per unit produces less output and hence earns lower total proﬁt.8 In the
limiting case where each sector has the same number of ﬁrms, quality, price, output,
and proﬁt are the same at every ﬁrm regardless of its sector.
If it is costless for a ﬁrm to move between the formal and informal markets, then
in the long run, proﬁts must equalize in the two sectors. Moreover, under laissez-
faire and under the two policies we will investigate, ﬁrms in each sector are free to
adjust their output until the per-unit proﬁt of expanding output equals the losses that
would be imposed on the inframarginal units sold by a ﬁrm. Consequently, proﬁts
8In this model, it is assumed that ﬁrms producing in one sector cannot disguise their products as
originating in the other sector in which ﬁrms may have a better reputation and earn higher proﬁts.
Presumably, this implicitly requires that the government identify and prohibit such deceptions as
they would be proﬁtable. Likewise, purchasing a good in the sector with the lower price and reselling
it in the sector with the higher price is prohibited.
9at a ﬁrm in sector j will equal q2
jU￿(Q)f o rj = F,I. It follows that in the long-run
equilibrium, output will equalize among ﬁrms in the two sectors, and so will proﬁt
per unit. Hence, in the long-run equilibrium, only price, quality, and the number
of ﬁrms can diﬀer between the two sectors. Moreover, the sector with the higher
quality must always have the higher price; otherwise, no consumer would buy the
other sector’s merchandise. As we shall see, under laissez faire these variables equalize
in the long-run equilibrium. Under a subsidy (respectively, tax), quality and price
are strictly higher (resp., strictly lower) in the informal sector, while the number of
ﬁrms is strictly lower (resp., higher) in the informal sector. Under a minimum quality
standard, price and quality equalize across sectors, and the formal sector has more
ﬁrms.
This discussion suggests the following proposition:
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that moving between the formal market and informal market
is costless. In the absence of any regulation on the formal market, in the long-run
equilibrium the number of ﬁrms operating in each market will be equalized. Moreover,
all ﬁrms will produce the same output at the same quality. Proﬁts will be equalized
across sectors and across all ﬁrms.
Proof In long-run equilibrium, because switching between sectors is costless, ﬁrms
will reallocate themselves until the proﬁts earned in the formal market are equal to
the proﬁts earned in the informal sector. By the discussion above, the only way for
proﬁts to be equalized is for the number of ﬁrms across sectors to be equalized. If
the number of ﬁrms in each sector is equal, then outputs and quality choices will be
equalized across sectors as well.
103 Consequences of Two Policies
Suppose now that the formal market and informal market are in long-run equilibrium,
i.e., the number of ﬁrms operating in each market is equal, and proﬁts, output, and
qualities are equalized across sectors, when the government chooses to enact regulations
directed at the formal market. In particular, we will ﬁrst consider the impact of the
government instituting a constant per-unit subsidy τ on ﬁrms operating in the formal
sector. We have the following result:
Theorem 3.1 If an equal number of ﬁrms are initially located in each sector, then in
the short run, the imposition of a per-unit subsidy (τ<0) on the formal sector will
raise the proﬁts of the formal sector relative to the informal sector.
In the long run, the formal market will be larger than the informal market and will
oﬀer lower qualities and lower prices than the informal market.
If a per-unit tax (τ>0), is imposed every qualitative statement about the short-run
and long-run equilibrium is reversed.
Proof When the regulations are imposed, each sector has an equal number of ﬁrms:
nF = nI = n/2. Given the imposition of the subsidy, we can write the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the ﬁrms in the formal market as
θR
F − U(Q) − (c(kF)+τ) − qFU





￿(kF)=0 ( 9 )
The ﬁrst-order conditions of ﬁrms in the informal market are unchanged. From this,
one can immediately see that in the short run, the imposition of the subsidy has no
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(1 + nF + nI)U￿(Q)+( nFqF + nIqI)U￿￿(Q)
< 0( 1 2 )
As (12) indicates, the subsidy must increase aggregate production; every term in the
denominator of (12) is strictly positive. Given this induced aggregate expansion, the
subsidy must cause every ﬁrm in the informal sector to contract (as the previous
inequality indicates). As for ﬁrms in the formal sector, the subsidy must cause them to
expand as (10) reﬂects, because otherwise every ﬁrm would contract, contradicting the
result established above that aggregate production expands. Because both factors in
the last term of equation (8) increase, proﬁt per unit in the formal market increases as
well. Thus, proﬁts in the formal sector increase. Proﬁts must decrease in the informal
sector. This follows because the subsidy lowers output per ﬁrm in the informal sector
and—because consumer utility increases—must result in a lower price and proﬁt per
unit.
In the long run, ﬁrms operating in the informal market will move to the formal
market to take advantage of the subsidy. In other words, nF will increase and nI will
decrease. From the ﬁrst-order conditions, it is easy to see that the reputed quality will
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Aggregate output may either expand or contract in response to the reallocation of
ﬁrms across the two sectors. However, in both cases, output per ﬁrm contracts in
the formal sector and expands in the informal sector.9 Firms will continue to move
from the informal sector to the formal sector until proﬁts are equalized. In long-run
equilibrium, the formal market will be larger and will oﬀer lower quality goods at lower
price relative to the informal market.
This result illustrates the surprising eﬀects of the ability of ﬁrms to move in and out of
the formal and informal sectors. Due to the additive separability of the inverse demand
function, in the short run a subsidy has no impact on the qualities of goods produced
in both the formal market and the informal market. If the goal of the government is
strictly to improve quality, then in the short run subsidies are a completely ineﬀective
form of regulation. However, they still do increase the proﬁts of ﬁrms operating in
the formal market, which in the long run incentivizes ﬁrms operating in the informal
market to move to the formal sector to take advantage of the subsidies. This then has
the eﬀect of lowering the quality in the formal market and raising the quality in the
formal market. Thus, in the long run, subsidies actually degrade the quality of goods
within the ambit of regulation and eﬀectively raise the quality of goods outside the
ambit of regulation.
9To see this, suppose that aggregate output decreases. Since θ ≥ c￿(kI) ≥ 0, dkI
dnF > 0, and U(Q)
is strictly increasing and convex, it is clear from equation (15) that output expands in the informal
sector. But then if aggregate output decreases, it must be that output contracts in the formal sector.
Similarly, if aggregate output increases, one can show from equation (14) that output decreases in
the formal sector, which implies that output increases in the informal sector.
13We now analyze the case where the government decides to regulate the quality of
the product in the formal market in the form of a minimum quality standard. We
assume that the standard (¯ k)i sb i n d i n go nﬁ r m si nt h ef o r m a ls e c t o rb u ti sn o ts e t
higher than ﬁrm would choose if it were the only domestic producer, and hence its
products could be readily identiﬁed by consumers.
That is, we assume ¯ k ≤ k∗, where k∗ solves θ = c￿(k∗).10 We establish the following:
Theorem 3.2 In the short run, the imposition of a minimum quality standard on the
formal sector raises the output and proﬁts of ﬁrms in the formal market while lowering
the output and proﬁts of unregulated ﬁrms in the informal market. Overall, aggregate
output expands. Quality rises in the formal sector and remains unchanged elsewhere.
In the long run, ﬁrms move from the informal sector to the formal sector, and
proﬁts, proﬁt per unit, output, and quality equalize across sectors.
Proof The imposition of the standard must strictly increase aggregate production of
the experience good. For, suppose the contrary. Suppose aggregate quantity falls or
remains constant. Then the utility that consumers get from the experience good must
weakly decrease. In the informal sector, ﬁrms would maintain quality, as equation (7)
still holds. So if their goods provide weakly less net utility, the prices of their goods
(P j = θkj − U(Q)) must weakly increase. Because the per-unit proﬁt (P j − c(kj))
would then weakly increase, equation (6) implies that output at each unregulated ﬁrm
must weakly increase. As for the regulated ﬁrms in the formal market, their per-unit
proﬁt must strictly increase, because the standard raised quality and, by assumption,
was not excessive (¯ k<k ∗). Equation (6) then implies that output at each regulated
ﬁrm strictly increases. But then we have a contradiction: aggregate output cannot
weakly decrease as we hypothesized, as this implies that the sum of the individual ﬁrm
outputs would strictly increase.
10This is also the socially optimal quality chosen by a social planner to maximize welfare.
14So the imposition of a minimum quality standard in one market must cause aggre-
gate output of the experience good to strictly increase and hence must cause the net
utility of every consumer of the good to increase. As the quality of the unregulated
ﬁrms in the informal sector does not change, their prices, proﬁt per unit, output, and
total proﬁts must fall. Because aggregate output expands despite the contraction at
every unregulated ﬁrm, output at every regulated ﬁrm must increase. But, as equa-
tion (6) implies, regulated ﬁrms would expand output only if their proﬁt per unit also
increased. Hence, their total proﬁts would also increase. Because proﬁt per unit in-
creases at each regulated ﬁrm, its price per unit must increase by more than enough
to oﬀset the increased cost per unit of producing the higher quality mandated by the
minimum quality standard.
In the long run, ﬁrms will abandon the informal market and join the formal market.
This will raise the quality of the product in the informal market, while the quality in
the formal market remains ﬁxed at the level imposed by the minimum quality standard.
Note that equation (6) implies that if proﬁt per unit is higher in one sector, then output
is higher in that sector, which implies proﬁt is higher. Thus, in long-run equilibrium,
proﬁt per unit and output must be equalized across sectors. Because proﬁt per unit
(θkj −U(Q)−c(kj), for j = F,I)i se q u a l i z e da c r o s ss e c t o r s ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tq u a l i t y
must also be equalized across sectors.
This result is quite interesting. It demonstrates that given the lack of ﬁrm traceability
with regard to quality, the government can indirectly, yet eﬀectively, regulate the
entire market for a good through regulations on only the formal sector. Intuitively,
the minimum quality standard actually creates a comparative advantage for the formal
sector, which leads ﬁrms to move out of the informal market. As ﬁrms leave the
informal market, the collective reputation problem is ameliorated, which endogenously
raises the quality of goods in this sector. This process continues until the quality of
15good in the informal market is exactly equal to the quality speciﬁed by the standard.
4 Conclusion
This paper assumes that consumers can purchase a product from either the formal
or informal sector and can assess the quality of that product only from the collective
reputation of the sector where it is purchased. In this circumstance, ﬁrms will free
ride on quality eﬀorts of others in that sector, and as a result, quality provision in
each sector will be suboptimal. If a per-unit subsidy is imposed on ﬁrms in the formal
sector, many will eventually migrate to it from the informal sector, exacerbating the
free riding there and lowering quality. If, on the other hand, regulators implement a
minimum quality standard in the formal sector, then again ﬁrms have an incentive to
migrate to the regulated sector. However, under this policy, there is less free riding in
the informal sector because fewer ﬁrms remain in it and less free riding in the formal
sector as a result of the quality standard. Therefore, a minimum quality standard
imposed on ﬁrms in the formal sector will increase quality in both sectors.
The idea of a government intervention in one area beneﬁting agents in another
area despite the absence of any intervention in that area has other applications. For
example, if a ﬁxed number of motorists commute from the same origin to the same
destination on two congestible roads, then expanding one road so that commute time
for any given number of cars is reduced will attract motorists from the other road
and will therefore reduce the commute time on that other road, even though the
government has made no improvements to that road. Similarly, suppose a ﬁxed number
of ﬁshermen must choose which of two lakes to patronize, and there is a common
property congestion externality on each lake. Without any regulation, both lakes
would be overﬁshed in comparison with the social optimum. However, if one lake is
16regulated so that the payoﬀ per ﬁsherman is increased for any number of ﬁshermen,
then in the long run, this would draw ﬁshermen away from the unregulated lake,
reducing congestion there. Migration would continue until the payoﬀs on the two
lakes equalized. One can think of other examples where everyone is helped although
regulators conﬁne their intervention to a subset of ﬁrms or people.
In the case of the highway expansion, it is quite plausible that commute time will
improve on both roads to exactly the same extent. In the case of a minimum qual-
ity standard in the formal market, quality is likely to rise in the regulated market.
Whether it rises to the same extent in the informal market as our model predicts de-
pends on factors from which we have abstracted. Although a standard might in reality
aﬀect quality in the informal market less than in the formal market, the movement of
quality in the same direction in the two markets might make identifying empirically
the full eﬀects of the regulation a challenge.
17A Proof of Theorem 2.1
Lemma A.1 There exists a nontrivial equilibrium in which in each sector j, every
producer of the experience good is either active or inactive. If a sector is active, each
ﬁrm sells the same unique strictly positive amount (qj > 0) with the same unique
strictly positive quality (kj > 0). There is at least one active sector.











kj ≥ 0,q j[P
j
2(Q,kj) − njc
￿(kj)] ≤ 0, c.s. (18)
where Rj = kj.
To begin, consider the solution to equation (18) given a particular Q and qj.I f
the ﬁrm is inactive (qj = 0), then any quality choice will solve the equation. Now let
˜ kj =( c￿)−1(θ/nj). If the ﬁrm is active, it is clear that for all 0 ≤ Q< ¯ Q(˜ kj), ˜ kj is the
unique nonzero solution to equation (18). For Q ≥ ¯ Q(˜ kj), there is no nonzero solution.
Let us now consider the system of equations given by (16) and (17) when kj = ˜ kj
for all j. Note that P j(0,˜ kj) − c(˜ kj)=θ˜ kj − c(˜ kj) > 0f o ra l lj.11 Next, deﬁne
ˆ Q(˜ kj) < ¯ Q(˜ kj)s u c ht h a tP( ˆ Q(˜ kj),˜ kj)=c(˜ kj). Then the solution to (16) is qj =0f o r
all Q ≥ ˆ Q(˜ kj). By totally diﬀerentiating equation (16) with respect to Q,w eﬁ n dt h a t
11Let ˆ k =( c￿)−1(θ). Then since c(0) = 0 and the cost function is convex, we know k − c(k)i s
maximized at ˆ k.S i n c e˜ kj ≤ ˆ k for all j, it follows that θ˜ kj − c(˜ kj) > 0 for all j.















< 0( 1 9 )
Now let f(Q)=
￿
j=F,I njqj(Q)a n dQH =m a x { ˆ Q(˜ kF), ˆ Q(˜ kI)}.T h e nf(Q)i sc o n t i n -
uous and strictly decreases from f(0) > 0t of(QH)=0a n df(Q)=0f o ra l lQ ≥ QH.
Thus, the curve will cross the 45o line exactly once at some 0 <Q ￿ <Q H.L e tk￿
j = ˜ kj
and q￿
j = qj(Q￿)f o ra l lj.I f Q￿ < ˆ Q(˜ kj) < ¯ Q(˜ kj), then q￿
j > 0, and if Q￿ ≥ ˆ Q(˜ kj),
then q￿
j =0 .T h ep r o ﬁ l e( ( k￿
j)j=F,I,(q￿
j)j=F,I,Q ￿) satisﬁes the Kuhn-Tucker necessary
conditions. Note that at least one market will be active, since Q￿ <Q H.
Because by assumption the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm is pseudoconcave, the spec-
iﬁed solution constitutes a Nash equilibrium.12
The following two lemmas demonstrate that in any non-trivial equilibrium, active ﬁrms
do not produce the minimum quality and active countries cannot have inactive ﬁrms.
Lemma A.2 There can be no nontrivial equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise) in
which a ﬁrm produces a positive quantity of the minimum quality.
Proof If it is optimal to produce at minimum quality (kij =0 ) ,t h e ns i n c ec￿(0) = 0,
condition (5) requires that P2(Q,Rj)
qij
Qj ≤ 0. But each of the factors to the left of
this inequality is strictly positive since, by hypothesis, qij > 0a n dw ea r ec o n s i d e r i n g
nontrivial equilibria. So the inequality can never hold. Therefore, every ﬁrm with
qij > 0 must have kij > 0.
12If pseudoconcavity does not hold, there may be nonlocal deviations that are optimal for a given
ﬁrm. If this is the case, then one can use an iterative process to solve for the Nash equilibrium. In
equilibrium, a sector may ﬂood the market with goods, thereby achieving zero price. See McQuade
et al. (2010) for a much fuller and detailed discussion of this issue within the context of collective
reputations in international markets.
19Intuitively, because the cost function is ﬂat at the origin but inverse demand is strictly
increasing in quality when the price is nonzero, an active ﬁrm producing a minimal
quality can always increase its proﬁt by marginally increasing its quality choice. At
the margin, costs will remain the same but the price will increase.
Lemma A.3 There can be no nontrivial equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise) in
which an active market can have an inactive ﬁrm.
Proof Suppose that qij =0a n dQj > 0. In that case, one or more of the rival ﬁrms is
producing a strictly positive amount. Label as ﬁrm i￿ the active ﬁrm with the smallest
quality. Hence, ki￿j − Rj ≤ 0. Because ﬁrm i￿ produces a strictly positive amount, its





2(Q,Rj)(ki￿j−Rj)/Q are respectively strictly and weakly negative, (4) implies
P j(Q,Rj)−c(ki￿j) > 0. But because the cost function is strictly increasing, P(Q,Rj)−
c(0) > 0, and this same complementary slackness condition, which must hold for ﬁrm
i as well, implies that qij > 0, contradicting the hypothesis that qij =0 .
Given the previous results, we have the following lemma:
Lemma A.4 There exist no nontrivial pure strategy Nash equilibria in which ﬁrms in
active markets produce diﬀerent qualities and/or outputs.
Proof Consider an active sector j.B yt h et w op r e v i o u sl e m m a s ,t h eﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n -
ditions of each ﬁrm in this sector must hold with equality. That is, the following






j − U(Q) − c(kij)} =0 ( 2 0 )
Deﬁne the left-hand side as Γj(kij;Q,Rj). In equilibrium, every ﬁrm (i =1 ,...,n j)
will have Γj(kij;Q,Rj) = 0. However, this equation cannot have more than one root.
20We see that ∂Γj
∂kij(kij;Q,Rj)=[ kij −(Rj −
QU￿(Q)
θRj )]c￿￿(kij), and (20) requires that at any
root, the ﬁrst factor in ∂Γj
∂kij(kij;Q,Rj)m u s tb es t r i c t l yn e g a t i v e . 13
Hence, there can be no more than one root. So for any given equilibrium with
its (Q,Rj), a unique kij satisﬁes equation (20). But because equation (20) must hold
for every ﬁrm, each ﬁrm must choose the same quality in this equilibrium. Denote
it kj(Q,Rj). Moreover, as every ﬁrm will be active and reputed quality will equal
Rj = kj(Q,Rj), equation (4) implies that qij =
θRj−U(Q)−c(kj(Q,Rj))
−U￿(Q) .B e c a u s et h er i g h t -
hand side of this equation is independent of i,e v e r yﬁ r mw i l lp r o d u c et h es a m eq u a n t i t y
in this equilibrium. Denote it qj(Q,Rj).
13The term in braces in (20) must be strictly positive, since qij > 0 (from Lemma A.3); condition
(16) therefore holds with equality, and P1 < 0 by assumption.
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